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ExEcutivE Summary
Competitive Hotel 
Pricing in Uncertain 
Times
by Cathy A. Enz, Linda Canina, and Mark Lomanno
T
his analysis of the pricing (ADR), demand (occupancy), and revenue (RevPAR) dynamics in the 
U.S. hotel industry for the period 2001 through 2007 demonstrates the potentially negative 
consequences of attempting to maintain market share by offering prices below those of direct 
competitors. This seven-year study examined the outcomes of pricing behavior on total rooms 
revenue and occupancy for hotels and their competitors in both bad times (2001-2003) and good 
(2004-2007). The results are the same in both periods. Hotels that offer average daily rates above those 
of their direct competitors experienced lower occupancies compared to those other hotels, but recorded 
higher relative RevPARs. For 67,008 hotel observations, this pattern of demand and revenue behavior 
was consistent for hotels in all market segments, from luxury to economy. Overall the results suggest 
that the best way to have better revenue performance than your competitors is to have higher average 
rates. The findings suggest that lodging demand may be inelastic in local markets, and hotel operators 
may wish to resist the pressure to undercut competitors when possible.
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cornELL hoSpitaLity rEport
Many hoteliers contend that discounting room rates is a necessity during tough economic times—and also a strategy to “steal market share” in good times. With the current economic slowdown, issues surrounding room rate positioning have again surfaced. Looking back to other economic recessions, the challenges 
facing the lodging industry after September 11, 2001, led many hotel operators to discount in the hopes 
of stimulating consumer demand or capturing additional market share from their competitors, with 
the objective of enhancing revenue. Other operators resisted discounting, and faced what Lodging 
Hospitality editor Edward Watkins called the dilemma of the empty room.1 As the economy began to 
recover, the industry saw demand and then prices rise, starting about 2004. Then, as 2007 came to a 
close, the industry again appeared to be bracing for another bout of bad times—and as we now know, 
those bad times arrived. Once again, some hotels have discounted their prices while others have held 
fast. As Patricia Davis, corporate director of revenue management for Kor Group, stated: “When times 
are good, you set up your strategy and sort of just close (deals) as business comes in as you expect it, 
but when you’re in a situation like right now, where the unexpected happens every day, you’re trying to 
figure out what to tweak.”2 
1 Ed Watkins, “Readers React to Rate Dilemma,” Lodging Hospitality, Vol. 59, No. 8 (2003), p. 4.
2 Adam Kirby, “Revenue Management Automation Boosts Efficiency by Making Forecasting Automatic; Revenue Managers Can Double as Marketers,” 
Hotels, February 1, 2009, www.hotelsmag.com/article/CA6633402.html?q=pricing.
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We have been investigating this matter of hotels’ pric-
ing strategy in relation to their competitive set. This paper 
reports the outcomes of our study of the pricing, demand 
(occupancy), and revenue (RevPAR) dynamics in the U.S. 
hotel industry for the periods of 2001 through 2003 (which 
we characterize as bad times) and 2004 through 2007 (which 
arguably were strong economic times). Our goal is to un-
derstand the financial ramifications of hotels’ competitive 
pricing behavior in both bad and good times. 
A common observation about the hotel industry is that 
properties tend to set prices based in part on their competi-
tors’ pricing practices. However, competitors’ decisions to 
adjust their prices are not well understood, and so it is not 
always clear why some competitors reduce their rates or why 
others follow. The many factors shaping pricing decisions 
include cost, value, and elasticity.3 The strategy of lowering 
rates to satisfy customer demand, often called value pricing, 
is not a substitute for maintaining high quality, and can be 
extremely risky.4 However, many hoteliers have noticed that 
value pricing can sometimes increase market share through 
larger volume, and if costs are controlled, then aggressive 
3 J.M. Stibel, “Discounting Dos and Don’ts,” MIT Sloan Management 
Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Fall 2007), p. 8-9.
4 David K. Hayes and Lynn M. Huffman, “Value Pricing: How Low Can 
You Go?,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 36, 
No. 4 (February 1995), pp. 51–56. 
room pricing can elicit positive results. On the other hand, 
if low prices fail to cover such costs as maintenance and 
reserve for replacement, the long-run benefit may be di-
minished. The question to examine is whether holding rates 
higher than the competition (and suffering through reduced 
occupancy) is the better course. The study we conducted 
indicates that maintaining your hotel’s rate positioning 
(compared to the competition) is the better course. 
We must emphasize that this paper focuses on hotels’ 
rate setting in comparison to competing hotels. The study 
looks at hotels that price above their competition and those 
that price below their competitors. We compare how each 
set of hotels compares with regard to customer demand and 
total rooms revenue per available room. We acknowledge 
that cost and total revenue management issues are critical 
in making pricing decisions, but this investigation focuses 
only on issues of occupancy and revenue in competitive 
situations. Our decision to examine pricing behavior among 
competitors is due to the fact that many individual hotels are 
profoundly influenced by the actions of their direct competi-
tors. If competing hotels in a local market drop their prices, 
owners and operators feel pressure to follow by dropping 
prices to maintain parity with their competitive set. 
Jeff Higley, editor of Hotel News Now, is among those 
who have argued that holding rate is important for lodging 
8 The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University 
analyzed for each year rather than on a monthly basis to 
avoid pricing irregularities that may have occurred in a 
particular month that are not representative of the properties’ 
overall pricing strategy.8 We aggregated STR’s monthly rooms 
data to arrive at the annual number of rooms sold, annual 
number of rooms available, and annual rooms revenue for 
each property and each property’s competitive set for each 
year. The relevant competitors were determined by the indi-
vidual hotels, which provided their competitive set choices 
to STR. STR supplied the total monthly rooms data for the 
competitive set by property. Properties that had less than 
twelve months of data were eliminated from the sample. 
The key variables of interest in this study are the per-
centage differences between each hotel and its competitive 
set on price, demand, and revenue. Annual average daily 
rate (ADR), occupancy, and revenue per available room 
(RevPAR) were computed for each property in the sample 
and for each property’s competitive set. To assess the pric-
ing strategies we then compared the percentage difference 
in ADR between the hotel and its competitors. To calculate 
percentage difference in ADR, we subtracted the annual 
ADR of the competitive set from the that of the hotel in ques-
tion and converted that figure into a percentage by dividing 
the difference by the annual ADR of the competitive set and 
multiplying by 100. The result of this calculation is the per-
centage difference in ADR from that of the competitive set. 
For example, if a specific hotel had an annual ADR of $50.00, 
and the annual ADR of the competitive set was $60.00, the 
percentage difference would be -16.7 percent ([($50.00 - 
$60.00)/$60.00]x 100). Since the sample hotel in this example 
was lower priced than its competition, we would say that the 
percentage difference in ADR was negative, and the hotel’s 
$50.00 price represents a difference of 16.7 percent below its 
competitive set. The percentage differences in RevPAR and 
occupancy were computed similarly. 
To ensure that these comparisons are not driven by 
non-competitors, we excluded properties that were unable 
to achieve a percentage difference in RevPAR within one 
standard deviation of the average of their competitors (that is, 
one standard deviation from a zero difference from that aver-
age). It is important that the performance of a given hotel be 
comparable to that of its competitive set; otherwise the study 
may err by attempting to compare substantially different 
hotels, or, in any event, hotels that are not actual competitors. 
There are many reasons why a hotel may not be comparable 
to its competitive set. Some properties are included in a 
hotel’s competitive set because they are nearby, even though 
they serve a different market segment. In such a case, the 
performance differences of two adjacent (and nominally 
8 Joseph A. Ismail, Michael C. Dalbor, and Juline E. Mills, “Using RevPAR 
to Analyze Lodging-segment Variability,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant 
Administration Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2002), pp. 73–80.
business health in both the short- and long-term.5 This ad-
vice is based on the view that rate reductions if improperly 
conceived or poorly executed would not improve revenues 
and could be dangerous for all players in the industry. A 
particular issue relating to the failure to maintain rate in-
tegrity is the phenomenon of anchoring. If customers see a 
hotel property charging a particularly low rate (in compari-
son to the competitive set), the customers may come to view 
that low rate as the “actual” value of the room. 
In our examination of competitive pricing, our focus 
is on individual hotels and their comparably performing 
direct competitors in local markets. To ensure that our 
study captures the competitive pressures which accompany 
pricing activities, we compare a hotel’s pricing strategies to 
that of its competitive set of like hotels with similar previous 
revenue performance. In short, we only look at competitors 
who were comparable in their rooms revenue performance 
for the previous year. 
The competitive set is a key element of this study for 
the simple reason that an individual hotel’s occupancy is in-
fluenced by the actions of its direct competitors. While pric-
ing guidelines may be set by brands and corporate strategy, 
pricing behavior is fundamentally driven by what is happen-
ing in local markets. The results of our study should help a 
hotel manager understand pricing behavior and determine 
pricing strategies. 
The Study 
In cooperation with the Center for Hospitality Research at 
Cornell University and Smith Travel Research (STR), we 
explored pricing behavior using 67,008 hotel observations 
over a seven-year period, from 2001 through 2007. In each 
year we began with a sample of between 11,056 (2001) and 
16,369 (2007) hotels. The data were drawn from the STR 
databases, which compile monthly room demand, room 
supply, and room revenue by property for over 98 percent of 
the population of branded lodging properties in the United 
States.6
By arrangement with STR, we obtained monthly 
property-level data over the seven-year period.7 Data were 
5 Jeffrey Higley, STR releases 2008, 2009, 2010 projections. Hotel News 
Now, October 23, 2008, www.hotelnewsnow.com/Articles.aspx?ArticleId
=253&ArticleType=0.
6 We would have preferred to explore GOPPAR (gross operating profit 
per available room), but unfortunately this bottom line information is 
not available. Business mix data would also be valuable for understand-
ing pricing behavior but is also unavailable for comprehensive industry 
analysis.
7 Extended stay hotels were excluded from this study because the typical 
traveler stays more than ten days at these hybrid apartment-all-suite-
hotel complexes. This lengthy stay means that these operations have 
distinctive demand characteristics. We also excluded resorts because of 
their seasonality (many close for parts of the year), and their all-inclusive 
nature, particularly with regard to including meals in the room rate.
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weaker RevPAR when rates were low compared to the prices 
of competitors was true for hotels in all three years. 
As shown in Exhibit 1, the maximum occupancy advan-
tage over the competitive set was obtained by those hotels 
that had the lowest comparative ADRs. For example in 2003, 
hotels that had ADRs 20- to 30-percent lower than their 
competitive set also had 15.54-percent higher occupancies. 
More critically, however, these low-price hotels also reported 
the lowest comparative RevPARs. Clearly, the strategy of 
putting heads in beds was accomplished by setting low rela-
tive prices. In 2003, the hotels with prices 20- to 30-percent 
below the competition reported annual RevPARs of 12.0 
percent below the competition. In sum, while the goal of in-
creased occupancy was achieved, the consequence for these 
hotels was RevPARs substantially lower than those of their 
competitive set.
Hotels that set their relative prices lower than those 
of competitors by less than 2 percent, on the other hand, 
experienced both occupancy and RevPAR premiums relative 
to their competitors, as did hotels that held their relative 
prices higher by less than 5 percent. When hotels’ relative 
prices were more than 2 percent lower than the average of 
their competition, those hotels were rewarded with higher 
comparative occupancies, but punished with lower relative 
revenue. Hotels with relative prices more than 5 percent 
above the competition, by contrast, saw comparatively lower 
occupancies, but were rewarded with higher relative revenue.
According to the data, the maximum performance 
benefit for hotels in 2003 was obtained by those maintain-
ing prices 15- to 20-percent above those of their competitive 
set. Hotels with these comparatively high rates recorded a 
7.06-percent lower occupancy, but had the largest compara-
Exhibit 1
revpar and occupancy percentage differences from the competitive set, 
2001–2003
 20-30 15-20 10-15 5-10 2-5 0-2 0-2 2-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30
 Lower higher
2001 occupancy 13.90 8.55 4.71 3.30 2.14 1.86 1.10 1.27 -0.24 -2.50 -5.38 -11.0
2001 revpar -13.6 -10.1 -8.17 -4.36 -1.39 0.86 2.05 4.80 7.12 9.37 10.80 9.48
2002 occupancy 15.51 9.77 5.78 3.45 2.35 1.45 1.29 1.06 -0.62 -2.88 -6.82 -11.9
2002 revpar -11.7 -9.26 -7.28 -4.26 -1.22 0.44 2.29 4.58 6.63 8.99 9.03 8.75
2003 occupancy 15.54 10.70 6.14 2.93 2.09 1.44 0.84 0.38 -0.81 -3.31 -7.06 -12.9
2003 revpar -12.0 -8.44 -6.89 -4.62 -1.49 0.40 1.80 3.90 6.43 8.51 8.73 7.53
aDr percentage difference from competitive set
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competitive) hotels are not due to dif-
ferences in pricing strategies. 
The competitive set, as defined by 
Smith Travel Research, requires a min-
imum of four properties to generate 
competitive set reports. It is possible that 
there are some locations in which there 
are fewer than four comparable hotels—
perhaps only one. For those properties, it 
is impossible to create a comparable com-
petitive set. For example, if the competi-
tive set of an economy hotel contained 
only upscale properties, then its price 
and RevPAR are probably lower than 
those of its competitors regardless of the 
hotel’s pricing strategy. If we included 
this property in the sample then we may 
make erroneous conclusions that lower 
relative prices are associated with lower 
relative RevPARs, when in fact it may be impossible for an 
economy hotel to achieve RevPAR performance at least as 
great as that of upscale properties. Hence, to err on the side 
of a conservative and fair comparison, we eliminated from 
our sample any hotels for which their past performance 
was not comparable to that of their competitors. While this 
approach reduced our sample size, it does provide a cautious 
approach to comparing prices among competing hotels.
Pricing Strategies and Hotel Differences
The sample hotels, comprising 67,008 observations, were 
grouped into twelve different pricing strategies based on the 
percentage difference in their ADR from their competitive 
set. For example, a hotel with an annual rate that was 5- to 
10-percent higher than its competitors would be grouped 
with other hotels that had a similar price difference from 
their competitive set. The price difference categories ranged 
from 20- to 30-percent above the competitive set to 20- to 
30-percent below the competitive set. After grouping hotels 
according to their pricing differences, the percentage differ-
ence between each hotel and its competitive set on occu-
pancy and RevPAR were calculated and mapped.
The Bad Times 
First, we examined all hotels during the turbulent years of 
2001 through 2003. Exhibit 1 shows the average percentage 
difference in occupancy and RevPAR performance for hotels 
that had higher ADRs than their competitors or lower ADRs 
compared to their competition. Overall, for hotels that held 
their price below that of their competitive set, average per-
centage differences in occupancies were higher, but average 
percentage differences in RevPARs were lower, compared to 
their competition. This pattern of stronger occupancy but 
10 The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University 
tive RevPAR, 8.73-percent higher than 
competing hotels. In each of the three 
years, the hotels that did not undercut 
their competitors on price saw higher 
comparative revenues per room. Like-
wise, in all three years, those hotels 
that offered average daily rates below 
their competitive set were relatively 
lower RevPAR performers, despite 
higher occupancies. These results 
might provide some support for the 
idea that demand is inelastic in bad 
times because those with lower rela-
tive prices also have lower compara-
tive revenues. It appears that offer-
ing relatively lower prices does not 
stimulate sufficient demand to permit 
higher revenues. Let’s examine what 
happened in the booming economy of 
the subsequent years.
The Good Times
As the industry began to rebound 
in 2004, one might expect that the 
outcomes of pricing behavior would 
also change, but this turned out not 
to be the case. Exhibit 2 shows the 
percentage differences in RevPAR and 
occupancy performance for hotels 
that offered lower ADRs than their 
competitors did from 2004 through 
2007 and for those that maintained 
higher ADRs compared to their 
competitive group. Interestingly, the 
analysis suggests a pattern of occupan-
cies and RevPARs similar to what we 
saw in the previous analysis. Hotels 
that undercut competitors’ rates 
experienced higher occupancies, but 
their average RevPARs were lower 
than those of their competition. This 
pattern of higher occupancy but lower 
RevPAR was similar to the pattern 
found for the 2001–2003 period.
For each year from 2004 through 
2007, the maximum occupancy ad-
vantage over the competitive set was 
obtained by those hotels that priced 
20- to 30-percent lower than their 
competitors did. In 2007, for example, 
hotels that had the lowest ADRs 
relative to their competitive set also 
Exhibit 2
revpar and occupancy percentage differences from the competitive set, 
2004–2007
2001-2007 2001-2003 2004-2007
pricing category
number of 
observations
percentage of 
observations
percentage of 
observations
percentage of 
observations
20-30% 3,082 4.60% 4.56% 4.62%
15-20% 4,135 6.17% 5.97% 6.29%
10-15% 6,835 10.20% 10.02% 10.31%
5-10% 10,182 15.20% 15.23% 15.17%
2-5% 7,397 11.04% 11.27% 10.90%
0-2% 5,297 7.91% 8.05% 7.82%
0-2% 5,185 7.74% 7.83% 7.68%
2-5% 6,943 10.36% 10.55% 10.25%
5-10% 9,222 13.76% 13.68% 13.81%
10-15% 5,056 7.55% 7.71% 7.44%
15-20% 2,345 3.50% 3.38% 3.57%
20-30% 1,329 1.98% 1.75% 2.13%
total 67,008 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Exhibit 3
Distribution of hotels by competitive price category, 2001–2007
 20-30 15-20 10-15 5-10 2-5 0-2 0-2 2-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30
 Lower higher
2004 occupancy 16.33 9.28 5.82 3.30 2.13 1.44 0.55 0.55 -0.35 -3.35 -7.54 -11.81
2004 revpar -11.16 -9.60 -7.14 -4.31 -1.41 0.44 1.55 4.02 6.93 8.44 8.33 9.05
2005 occupancy 16.08 9.00 5.79 3.11 1.73 2.09 1.43 1.31 -0.14 -2.60 -6.26 -12.46
2005 revpar -11.32 -9.82 -7.20 -4.52 -1.84 1.08 2.45 4.84 7.07 9.29 9.73 8.14
2006 occupancy 15.18 8.58 4.82 2.88 1.63 1.81 1.24 0.42 -0.50 -2.77 -6.56 -12.77
2006 revpar -12.38 -10.21 -8.10 -4.67 -1.88 0.79 2.20 3.91 6.78 9.07 9.54 7.74
2007 occupancy 15.21 8.49 4.53 2.34 1.92 1.29 1.32 0.65 -0.54 -3.43 -7.17 -10.90
2007 revpar -12.24 -10.28 -8.31 -5.23 -1.65 0.29 2.32 4.16 6.71 8.30 8.81 10.29
aDr percentage difference from competitive set
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had 15.21-percent higher occupancies. 
This performance benefited them little 
in terms of revenue, as these low-price 
hotels still had the lowest comparative 
RevPARs. Thus, we observe that in 
good times, lower rates yielded occu-
pancy benefits, but diminished RevPAR 
when compared to competing hotels. 
It is interesting to note, as shown 
in Exhibit 3, that around 66 percent of 
all hotels were pricing within 10 percent 
of their competition. The most frequent 
price position for hotels that undercut 
their competitors was 5- to 10-percent 
below the competitive set. For proper-
ties that charged a premium compared to 
competitors, the most popular price point 
was also in the 5- to 10-percent difference 
range. In total almost 30 percent of the 
hotels in this sample set their prices either 
5- to 10-percent above their competitors 
or 5- to 10- percent below the competition. 
Only 7 percent of hotels were found in 
either of the extreme pricing levels, that is, 20- to 30 percent 
above competitors or a similar range below the competi-
tion. Finally, 16 percent of operators kept their prices nearly 
identical to the competition, with rates either 0- to 2-percent 
above competitors or no more than 2 percent below. An-
other 21 percent of hotels set their prices within 5 percent of 
the competition. The percentage of properties in each rela-
tive pricing category is similar for both of the test periods. 
This summary of hotels’ pricing behavior from 2001 through 
2007 shows that a large portion of hotels strive to price close 
to their competitors, but a policy of undercutting or aggres-
sively pricing by 5- to 10-percent relative to the competition 
is the most common pricing strategy. 
Pricing by Market Segment
Hotels are typically categorized into broad price and quality 
bands, including luxury, upper upscale, upscale, midscale 
with F&B (full service), midscale without F&B (limited 
service), and economy. Hotels in these market segments vary 
on rate, amenities, facilities, and services. A preliminary 
examination of the data revealed only modest differences 
in the pricing behavior of hotels in various market seg-
ments. Since the pattern of pricing is similar for all market 
segments we gathered upmarket hotels into one group and 
low-price hotels into another group, to examine patterns 
of pricing for several market segments. For this taxonomy, 
we relied on STR’s market scale segments, grouping hotels 
based on their actual, system-wide average room rates. We 
aggregated the pricing data for the entire seven-year time 
horizon because the yearly patterns were not substantially 
different.9 
Luxury, Upper Upscale, and Upscale Hotels 
Beginning with the most luxurious hotels in the United 
States, as shown in Exhibit 4, occupancies are generally 
lower when rates are comparatively higher. However, the 
hotels that maintained prices above those of the competi-
tion showed solid RevPAR superiority. In a pattern that is 
different from the industry as a whole, both occupancies and 
RevPAR were relatively higher for upper upscale and upscale 
hotels that priced as much as 10 percent higher than their 
competitors did. The expected decline in occupancies com-
pared to competitor hotels was observed only after upscale 
and upper upscale hotels set prices 10- to 15-percent above 
the competition. The largest percentage advantage occurred 
in upscale hotels, followed by upper upscale properties and 
then luxury hotels. We note that luxury hotels that priced 
20- to 30-percent above their competitors had 13.17 percent 
higher RevPARs.
9 For those interested in more detailed data on individual years and 
market segments see Cathy A. Enz, Linda Canina, and Mark Lomanno,” 
“Why Discounting Doesn’t Work: The Dynamics of Rising Occupancy 
and Falling Revenue among Competitors,” Center for Hospitality Research 
Reports, Vol. 4, No. 7 (2004); www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/research/chr/
pubs/reports/abstract-13599.html; and Linda Canina and Cathy A. Enz, 
“Why Discounting Still Doesn’t Work: A Hotel Pricing Update,” Center for 
Hospitality Research Reports,Vol. 6, No. 2 (2006); www.hotelschool.cornell.
edu/research/chr/pubs/reports/abstract-13848.html.
Exhibit 4
revpar and occupancy percentage differences for luxury, upper upscale, 
and upscale hotels, compared to the competitive set, 2001–2007
 20-30 15-20 10-15 5-10 2-5 0-2 0-2 2-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30
 Lower higher
Luxury occupancy  11.67 3.87 2.29 0.04 1.55 -0.75 -0.49 -3.14 -3.45 -5.59 -8.76
Luxury revpar  -7.09 -8.49 -5.31 -3.35 0.69 0.43 3.00 4.13 8.54 10.75 13.17
upper upscale occupancy 12.50 5.90 3.54 2.43 1.79 1.82 1.89 1.02 0.68 -1.31 -5.25 -9.78
upper upscale revpar -13.35 -12.21 -9.20 -5.01 -1.75 0.81 2.87 4.49 8.05 10.63 10.87 11.30
upscale occupancy 10.54 5.04 2.99 2.42 3.15 2.63 2.47 3.18 1.66 -0.06 -3.03 -7.37
upscale revpar -15.24 -13.10 -9.65 -5.08 -0.39 1.68 3.50 6.80 9.17 12.18 13.53 14.04
independent revpar -16.31 -13.91 -12.37 -8,46 -4.02 -3.65 -0.84 1.71 4.12 7.37 9.33 9.53
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Midscale and Economy Hotels 
Economy hotels can see relatively 
stronger occupancy by maintaining 
lower prices relative to the competi-
tion. For hotels in this segment that 
price 20- to 30-percent lower than 
their competitors, dramatic occupancy 
differences (16.51-percent better than 
competitors) can be obtained, as il-
lustrated in Exhibit 5. It is unfortunate 
that this market share benefit also 
yields a substantial RevPAR underper-
formance, 11.36-percent lower than 
that of direct competitors. The experi-
ence of economy hotels that undercut 
their competitors on rate is similar to 
hotels in other segments. Their RevPAR 
suffers in relation to the competition. 
Economy hotels that price above their 
competitors see lower occupancy, but 
enjoy modest RevPAR benefits. In this 
market segment RevPAR premiums are far more modest 
than in the midscale segments. Midscale hotels without food 
and beverage that price above the competition appear to 
have the most dramatic RevPAR benefits of the downmarket 
hotels. By the same token, midscale hotels with food and 
beverage have the largest RevPAR penalty when they price 
below the competition. 
Lower occupancies and higher RevPARs are the norm 
for hotels that price above their competition in midscale and 
economy segments. Midscale hotels with food and beverage 
and economy hotels also see lower occupancy when they 
price just a little below the competition (less than 2 percent). 
Only hotels in the midscale segment without food and bev-
erage see stronger occupancy for being modestly aggressive 
with rates. As one might expect, the greatest benefits from 
maintaining low prices was experienced by economy hotels 
that pursue this strategy, because their customers are con-
sidered to be the most price sensitive. Nevertheless, even in 
the economy segment higher prices of over 5 percent above 
competitors produced RevPAR benefits of about 1.5 percent 
(1.47–1.72%). 
For all of the market segments in this seven-year period, 
the pattern of results reported in this study shows that 
undercutting competitors’ prices leads to higher occupancy 
and lower RevPAR compared to the competition. The lower 
occupancy that comes with higher prices is more than offset 
by improved RevPAR. The dynamics between price and 
occupancy appear quite stable from segment to segment, 
but the degree to which higher relative prices produce lower 
relative occupancy does vary by segment. 
Modest price undercutting of up to 5 percent showed 
the greatest comparative occupancy levels for hotels in the 
upscale segment. Deeper reductions, 5 to 10 percent, yielded 
the highest comparative occupancy levels for hotels com-
peting in the upper upscale segment. Finally, when luxury 
hotels held rates 10 to 20 percent lower, they experienced 
the greatest occupancy percentages of any high-end hotels. 
Luxury hotels did not engage in price cuts beyond that 
point, unlike some hotels in the upper upscale and upscale 
segments. Modest RevPAR premiums were found regardless 
of segment for hotels that held their room rates less than 2 
percent lower than competitors. Setting rates much lower 
yielded diminished RevPAR for all high-end hotels. We also 
note that, regardless of market segment, hotels that under-
cut competitors’ prices took away market share from their 
competitors and enjoyed relatively higher occupancy. Those 
hotels lose in terms of RevPAR, however, even if they win in 
terms of occupancy. 
Upscale and upper upscale hotels that priced within 
2 percent of their competitive set are quite similar in their 
RevPAR and occupancy performance. It appears that room 
rates that are set a modest 2 percent higher or lower relative 
to the competition are both viable strategies for hotels in 
these market segments. Luxury hotels fare better by pricing 
2- to 5-percent above their competitors in that their RevPAR 
performance is 3.00 percent above competitors, while oc-
cupancy is a mere .49 percent below their competitors, a 
smaller penalty than that of hotels which price less than 2 
percent above the competition.
Exhibit 5
revpar and occupancy percentage differences for midscale and 
economy hotels, 2001–2007
 20-30 15-20 10-15 5-10 2-5 0-2 0-2 2-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30
 Lower higher
midscale with F&b occupancy 13.30 6.39 3.87 1.84 -0.04 -0.17 -1.02 -1.40 -2.73 -4.73 -8.93 -13.26
midscale with F&b revpar -13.00 -12.00 -8.78 -5.69 -3.56 -1.17 -0.04 2.02 4.33 6.95 6.59 7.00
midscale without F&b occupancy 13.94 8.17 4.75 3.66 3.42 3.35 2.64 2.67 1.03 -1.84 -5.62 -10.60
midscale without F&b revpar -12.82 -10.31 -7.94 -3.86 -0.16 2.32 3.65 6.25 8.41 10.09 10.54 10.34
Economy occupancy 16.51 10.97 7.54 4.16 1.48 -0.01 -0.91 -3.43 -5.29 -9.53 -13.09 -18.16
Economy revpar -11.36 -8.30 -5.86 -3.75 -2.09 -1.03 0.02 -0.08 1.49 1.56 1.72 1.47
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Popular Pricing Strategies 
Since the most common price points 
in our sample were an average rate 
of either 5- to 10-percent above the 
competition or 5- to 10-percent below, 
we wanted to take a closer look at 
hotels in these two ranges. As shown 
in Exhibit 6, economy hotels were 
the biggest beneficiaries in terms of 
relatively occupancy when they priced 
5- to 10-percent below competitors. A 
key exception here is that midscale 
hotels with food and beverage hotels 
do not get the same occupancy benefit 
from lower prices. We believe this is 
because this segment generally ben-
efits when customers trade down to 
this segment from upscale properties. 
For hotels that priced 5- to 10-percent 
above their competitors, the occupancy or demand penalty 
was greatest for economy hotels. Luxury hotels also saw 
substantially lower occupancy (3.14% lower) when pricing 
5- to 10-percent above competitors. However, we see smaller 
occupancy differences for upper upscale hotels, which may 
be receiving customers that have traded down from the 
luxury level. The most interesting finding in this regard was 
for midscale hotels without food and beverage, which had 
higher occupancy than competitors when they priced 5- to 
10-percent above the competition. This market segment 
was the only segment to see stronger occupancy when they 
charged higher prices than competitors. 
Hoteliers who enjoyed the highest relative RevPAR 
when pricing 5- to 10-percent above their competitive sets 
were in the upscale, midscale without food and beverage, 
and upper upscale market segments (see Exhibit 6). Econo-
my hotels, on the other hand, gained a RevPAR advantage of 
only 1.49 percent by charging elevated prices, which is not 
surprising given the customers’ price sensitivity. The ben-
efits that were obtained by midscale limited service hotels 
(8.41% higher) were notable, and again may be a function 
of customers’ trading down. Once again, regardless of price 
segment, RevPAR benefits come to hotels that price above 
their competitors and consistent RevPAR penalties come to 
those which price below their competitors. The percentage 
differences in reduced RevPAR for low-price properties were 
similar across market segments, but those differences were 
the greatest for midscale full-service hotels and luxury hotels. 
Advice in Uncertain Times
Our analysis of the results of a large sample of hotels’ pricing 
behavior over a seven-year time horizon, in bad and good 
times, and across diverse market segments raise the follow-
ing implications, which we present as a series of questions 
and answers. 
• Does aggressive pricing relative to the competition lead 
to increases in occupancy and ultimately increases in 
RevPAR? 
—Yes and no. Offering guests prices that are lower than 
the competition does lead to higher occupancy percent-
ages for the lower-price hotel, but these comparatively 
lower prices also result in lower RevPAR performance 
than the competition.
• What happens when a hotel sets prices higher than its 
competitors? 
—Hotels that charge prices higher than their competitors 
have lower occupancies, but higher RevPARs, especially 
when they set prices significantly higher than those of 
their competitors. In adjusting prices, some competitors 
may experience customers’ trading down to lower mar-
ket segments, particularly out of luxury and full-service 
midscale hotels.
• What is the best way to make money compared to your 
competition? Should a hotel adjust its rates to fill rooms 
or maintain prices to earn what it can from customers? 
—The best way to have higher revenue performance 
than your competitors is to maintain higher rates than 
they do. A hotel should not set its rates below those 
of its true competitors if it wishes to enjoy a RevPAR 
premium. 
• Do the dynamics between changes in price and occupancy 
differ by price segments (e.g., upscale, economy) or vary 
by year? 
Exhibit 6
revpar and occupancy percentage differences by market segment for 
hotels that price either 5- to 10-percent above or 5- to 10-percent below 
their competitors, 2001–2007
market Segment
occupancy 
Difference when 
pricing below 
competitors
occupancy 
Difference when 
pricing above
revpar 
Difference when 
pricing below 
competitors
revpar 
Difference when 
pricing above
Luxury 2.29% Higher 3.14% Lower 5.31% Lower 4.13% Higher
upper upscale 2.43% Higher  .68% Lower 5.01% Lower 8.05% Higher
upscale 2.42% Higher 1.66% Lower 5.08% Lower 9.17% Higher
midscale with 
F&b
1.84% Higher 2.73% Lower 5.69% Lower 4.33 % Higher
midscale without 
F&b
3.66% Higher 1.03% Higher 3.86% Lower 8.41% Higher
Economy 4.16% Higher 5.29% Lower 3.75% Lower 1.49% Higher
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share from the competition, but they did not gain higher 
RevPAR. This may be due to the possibility that stealing 
share is not the same thing as stimulating new demand. 
Nothing in these results suggests that good yield-man-
agement programs are not appropriate. To the contrary, in a 
study of over 30,000 hotels between 2001 and 2005, two of 
the authors found that hotels that priced above their compe-
tition were most effective at revenue management, defined as 
the rate-to-occupancy relationship.14 So while good revenue 
management is essential, this study suggests there is nothing 
wrong with holding rates steady in both good or bad times, 
even when your competitors are adjusting their rates. For 
most market segments, holding rates even a small degree 
above the competition proved advantageous. Maintain-
ing rates in a competitive market when others are pricing 
aggressively will mean relatively lower occupancy but your 
hotel will make up for the fewer filled beds with higher 
RevPAR, as compared to the competition. 
In conclusion, this study argues against the race to the 
bottom that we have seen in so many markets. One hotelier 
put it this way, “When people break ranks it makes you 
look expensive. You obviously can’t have a cartel, but it also 
makes it difficult to put rates back up.”15 
Each manager, owner, and chain executive will need 
to decide on their own how to deal with the challenges 
of pricing in a difficult market, but a policy of matching 
competitors’ rate cuts puts your hotel at the mercy of the 
most foolish or most desperate competitor. The race to the 
bottom is augmented by the transparency of pricing today. 
You gain no competitive advantage by lowering your prices 
because your competitors know almost immediately about 
your strategy and can instantly match it.16 In short, not only 
can you not count on stronger revenue with lower prices, but 
once prices are reduced, it can be difficult to raise them.  n
14 Linda Canina and Cathy A. Enz, “Revenue Management in U.S. Hotels: 
2001-2005,” Center for Hospitality Research Reports, Vol. 6, No. 8 (2006), 
pp. 2-10.
15 Manson, op.cit.
16 Mark Lomanno, “Discounting Rates Leads to Decreased Product 
Value,” Hotel & Motel Management, Vol. 223, No. 21 (2008), p. 22.
—This study found small differences by market segment 
or by years of a strong or weak economy. The pattern 
of results is consistent across segments and years. We 
conclude that in good times or bad, setting prices 
higher than your direct competitors yields higher room 
revenues, while pricing below your competitors does 
not stimulate sufficient demand to provide the revenue 
boost needed to make up for the lower rates. Guests of 
luxury hotels appear to be insensitive to price position-
ing, while customers of economy hotels are quite sensi-
tive to small price differences.
Next Steps—Hotel Pricing Strategies
A wide variety of opinions exist on how to set hotel room 
rates. Many contend that discounting room rates is a neces-
sity during tough economic times. As Jeff Higley put it: “The 
calls for a halt in discounting will fall on deaf ears as long as 
there are bills to pay. And as long as its part of a yield-man-
agement program, there’s nothing wrong with discounting.”10 
Along the same line, one hotelier recently noted, “It’s pure 
common sense to react to the elasticity of demand, especially 
in the current climate.”11 Contrary to what common sense 
may suggest, this study implies that lodging demand is price 
inelastic. The evidence seems to suggest that lower prices 
mean lower revenue. Some hoteliers are cognizant of the 
need to maintain rates:, “You’ve still got fixed costs for staff 
and energy,” said one. “So it’s a much better route to offer a 
complimentary spa treatment or bottle of Champagne in the 
room, as you’ve got all the people there anyway.”12 Another 
suggested: “You’ve also got to be careful not to attract the 
wrong type of customers to your business, which you may 
do if you drop your rate dramatically.”13
Our study shows that hotels in direct competition bring 
in more money when they have comparatively higher prices. 
By contrast, hotels that offered low rates captured market 
10 Jeffrey Higley, “Discounting Isn’t Bad When It’s Done Correctly,” Hotel 
& Motel Management, July 21, 2003, p. 8.
11 Emily Manson, “To Discount or Not to Discount?,” Caterer & Hotel-
keeper, Vol. 198, No. 4559 (2009), p. 44.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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